Israeli secondary education culminates in the matriculation diploma (bagrut in Hebrew), which is a prerequisite for admission to most forms of tertiary education. The bagrut is differentiated into a university-qualifying and a plain diploma. The former provides access to universities, whereas the latter provides access to less-esteemed forms of postsecondary education. During the 1990s, the Israeli Ministry of Education implemented a series of policies that were designed to raise eligibility rates. As a consequence, the rates increased substantially (Kashti 1996 ). An important objective of the reforms was to raise eligibility among the weaker social groups in society: Arabs, disadvantaged Jewish ethnic groups, and the lower social strata. However, little is known about whether this objective was achieved. It is not known how the reforms may have affected eligibility rates for the plain or university-qualifying diploma among the various groups. This article attempts to fill this void.
Theoretically, the analysis is couched in the recent debate surrounding Raftery and Hout's (1993) hypothesis of maximally maintained inequality (MMI). MMI is a compelling theoretical statement regarding the effects of educational expansion on inequality in educational attainment among various strata. It states that on the whole, educational expansion does not reduce such educational inequalities. Rather, inequalities among the social strata are maintained as long as those in the privileged stratum can increase their educational attendance rates as fast or faster than those in the less-privileged strata. Only when the privileged stratum reach saturation at a given level of education will further expansion of that level reduce inequality.
MMI and the paradigm of research on educational transitions (Mare 1980 (Mare , 1981 In this article, we analyze the consequences of the bagrut reforms for socioeconomic, sex, and ethnic inequalities in the odds of attaining the bagrut. In doing so, we test both MMI and EMI under conditions preceding saturation. Our results are consistent with the arguments (Lucas 2001; Shavit and Kraus 1990) that qualitative differentiation enables educational systems to reduce inequalities along the quantitative dimension. In other words, when a given level of education is tracked, socioeconomic inequalities in the odds of its attainment can decline even before saturation has been reached. This proposition explains some of the empirical exceptions to MMI in which equalization appeared before saturation was reached by the privileged classes.
We proceed as follows: First, we describe the specific context in which the study was set-the Israeli matriculation reforms of the 1990s. Second, we discuss MMI and some of its critiques more fully. Third, we describe the data, the analysis, and the findings. We conclude by discussing some theoretical implications of the study.
THE REFORMS OF THE 1990S
At age 12, after a year in preschool and six years in primary school, Israeli children enter middle school, where they spend Grades 7, 8, and 9. Middle school is followed by upper secondary school in Grades 10-12. Upper secondary education consists of two main tracks: the academic track, which prepares students for the matriculation examinations leading to a bagrut diploma that is required for higher education, and the vocational track, which, until recently, trained most students in a vocation and prepared them for the world of work, rather than for further study.
Matriculation examinations are administered nationally and graded anonymously. The examinations are offered on a unit basis and can be taken at either a basic level (3 units) or an advanced level (4 or 5 units). To obtain the matriculation diploma, students must meet several requirements: (1) take examinations totaling at least 20 units; (2) be tested in seven compulsory subjects, two of which are English and mathematics (other subjects are Hebrew or Arabic, civic education, literature, history, and the Bible); and (3) pass all but one subject (failure in one subject is allowed).1 In recent cohorts, over 60 percent of the men and women sat for one or more matriculation examinations. However, only about half of them were eligible for the diploma. Math and English were the major stumbling blocks: only about 35 percent and 40 percent of recent birth cohorts passed the math and English examinations, respectively, compared, for example, with 50 percent who passed the Hebrew language examination.
The matriculation diploma is an important stage in the educational and occupational selection process. To a large extent, it determines whether one will attend higher education and become a professional or a manager or whether one will join the working class. To illustrate the point, among men who were born in the early 1960s who obtained a matriculation diploma, a quarter are professionals, managers, or semiprofessionals, compared with 3.2 percent of those who did not obtain the diploma.
Although, formally, the bagrut gains one access to higher education, the major universities admit only bagrut holders who meet three additional conditions: (1) they have passed the English examination at an advanced level, (2) they have passed any level of the mathematics examination, and (3) they have passed an additional examination at the advanced level. Only two thirds of bagrut holders meet these additional requirements. 
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Reforms
Reform of the Bagrut Examinations In 1994, Prime Minister Rabin appointed Amnon Rubinstein minister of education. Rubinstein was committed to reducing ethnic and class inequalities by raising overall bagrut eligibility rates, especially among the disadvantaged social strata. He reduced the number of compulsory external examinations from seven to four in the hope that with fewer examinations to prepare for, students would do better and success rates would rise. The three excluded subjects were selected by lottery each year during the last trimester, and school grades were substituted for examination grades. These steps were implemented as of the 1994-95 school year, and the results were encouraging. Rubinstein remained in office until 1996, and in 1997, his successor, Zebulon Hammer, did away with the lottery "system," replacing it with another.
The Reform in Vocational Education Israeli secondary education was fashioned after central European systems in which there is a clear distinction between academic education leading to the matriculation diploma, to higher education, and to the professions and vocational tracks that prepare most students for immediate entry into the labor force. In Israel, as elsewhere, track placement is closely linked to students' socioeconomic and ethnic origins. Thus, the system came under severe criticism for perpetuating and reproducing educational and occupational inequality across generations (see, e.g., Shavit 1984; Swirski 1990). The criticism was not confined to academic circles alone and was echoed in the press and public discourse. In response to mounting criticism of the vocational education system, which constitutes a semiautonomous section within the Ministry of Education, the ministry embarked on reforms, the essence of which was academization of the curriculum. The vocational components of the curriculum were replaced by academic subjects, and students were encouraged to sit for the matriculation examinations (Tzuk 1994) . Furthermore, through the late 1980s, vocational secondary education consisted of a hierarchy of tracks that were intended for students of different levels of scholastic achievement. The lowest track (the practical vocational track) was intended for the least-able students, and its curriculum was largely practical. The regular vocational track was intended for vocational students of intermediate achievements, and its curriculum consisted of both practical and academic components. Of the vocational tracks, only the matriculating vocational track (MASMAT) prepared students for the matriculation examinations. In 1991, tracking within the vocational system was formally abolished, and all students were encouraged to sit for part or the complete course of the matriculation examinations.
These reforms did not do away with tracking. Vocational schools, as well as vocational tracks within comprehensive schools, continue to exist as distinct entities, catering to academically less successful students who are disproportionately drawn from the less-privileged strata. However, the curricular distinction between the academic and vocational tracks was much reduced. 
BRINGING THEORY TO BEAR
Did the Rubinstein experiment and the academization of vocational education reduce inequalities among ethnic groups and social strata in matriculation rates? Social theory and research do not provide a uniform prediction in this regard. On the one hand, the MMI hypothesis predicts that the reforms did not affect inequality, whereas from EMI, we can derive a hypothesis that the differentiation of the bagrut reduced inequalities in the odds of its attainment but maintained or raised inequalities in the odds of attaining the more selective form of the diploma. As MMI (Raftery and Hout 1993) states, lowering curricular requirements and broadening educational opportunities can raise educational attainment rates among working-class and minority students, but these changes are not likely to reduce inequalities. When educational systems expand, opportunities are created not just for the less-privileged social classes, but for everyone. On average, the sons and daughters of privileged classes do better in school than do those of working-class origins; they have higher educational ambitions (Hauser, Tsai, and Sewell 1983) , are more familiar with school culture (see, e.g., Lareau 1989), and can afford to pay both the direct and indirect costs of education. In short, they are better prepared than are others to take advantage of new educational opportunities. Therefore, educational expansion does not reduce educational inequalities among classes. Only when the privileged classes have reached saturation with regard to a given level of education would further expansion of that level contribute to the reduction of inequality among classes. In other words, educational inequalities among social classes are maintained by educational expansion as long as privileged groups can continue to increase their attainment rates.
The When applied to the specific case presented here, the MMI hypothesis predicts that the easing of the examinations would raise matriculation rates among all ethnic and social groups but would retain the pattern of inequality among them. The most privileged social groups have not yet reached saturation in matriculation rates. Therefore, it may be some time before further expansion would reduce inequalities.
As we noted at the outset, MMI was However, Lucas later argued that "it is possible that even when quantitative differences are common, qualitative differences are also important" and posited that "the socioeconomically advantaged will use their socioeconomic advantages to secure both quantitatively and qualitatively better outcomes" (p. 1652). In other words, the qualitative dimension in the educational stratification process is prevalent irrespective of whether saturation has been reached. Data did not permit Lucas to test EMI in the absence of saturation. In our study, we followed Lucas, but focused on the qualitative dimension in the educational stratification process in the absence of saturation. We studied the consequences for educational stratification of qualitative differentiation during educational expansion.
Sociologists of education know that an educational system faces contradictory expectations and plays a dual and conflicting social role. At the same time, it is both an avenue for social mobility and a gatekeeper in an economically advanced society. It is required to reduce inequalities among social groups in the distribution of credentials, but the gatekeeping function requires the system to be selective and to ration credentials. Employers expect the educational system to be selective because they want credentials to filter able and diligent workers (see, e.g., Bills 1992; Thurow 1975). Professional organizations support selectivity in the educational system because it helps them maintain closure over their privileged positions (Collins 1979 , Parkin 1979 ). Teachers and administrators of the educational system favor educational selection because it enhances their own prestige and power as gatekeepers (Apple 1990 ). For these reasons, educational systems resist, with varying degrees of success, the pressure to open up and equalize the distribution of credentials.
When push comes to shove, educational systems respond to exclusionary pressures by a combined strategy of expansion and differentiation. By expansion, we mean increasing the proportions of cohorts who attend successive levels of the educational system. Expansion, however, can bring about the devaluation of educational credentials as their scarcity diminishes. To counter this liability, actors in the field (e.g., ministries of education and university systems) tend to accompany expansion with differentiation into more-and less-accessible tracks. Differentiation creates a situation in which education is indeed more accessible, but the stronger groups retain their hegemony in the morevalued tracks of the expanded system. Furthermore, once a system is differentiated, the less-selective track can be opened up further, leaving the role of social selection to the more selective one. This hypothesis is supported by research that has found that the proliferation of education and the absorption of broader social strata by the system created different tracks with various stratifying effects. For example, the expansion of secondary education in Israel, the United States, and other countries was accompanied by the formation of nonacademic tracks, intended mainly for new immigrants and working-class students (Labaree 1988; Powell, Farrar, and Cohen 1985; Shavit 1984; Swirski 1990 ). More recently, the expansion of postsecondary education in many countries has been accompanied by its differentiation into different classes of institutions that target hierarchically diverse social strata (Meek et al. 1996) . The expansion of second-tier colleges enables the more prestigious universities to remain selective.
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In the case of the Israeli bagrut, the major actors involved in the formation of bagrutrelated policies were the Ministry of Education and the universities. In response to public demand, the Ministry of Education attempted to increase the eligibility rates. The major opposition to lowering standards came from the six universities that existed in Israel until recently. These institutions were well organized in the Council for Higher Education and were well coordinated in defending their collective interests. The universities feared that expansion of bagrut eligibility rates would create an influx of ill-prepared university applicants and erode their prestige. The reaction of the universities to the major reform in the bagrut system in the late 1970s demonstrates this point and marks the beginning of the differentiation of the bagrut certificate. That reform allowed some flexibility in the mix of examinations. Whereas in the past, students were examined according to strictly defined programs, the reform gave them a certain degree of choice between subjects and levels of subjects. Following their concern that students might avoid advanced courses, in general, and the difficult ones in math and English, in particular, the universities changed their admission policy. First, they demanded an additional admission criterion-a general aptitude test, known in Israel as the psychometric test. Second, they promised priority in admission to high school graduates who took at least two advanced subjects, advanced English and at least the minimal level in math (Ministry of Education 1976). This change started the differentiation between the university-qualifying bagrut (UQB) and the plain bagrut. The existence of UQB enabled the implementation of the bagrut reform in the 1990s. Having UQB as the gatekeeper, the universities accepted the relaxation of requirements on the plain bagrut.
Following Lucas (2001) and the literature on tracking, we hypothesized that as eligibility rates increase and as the bagrut becomes less socially selective, social selection will shift to the level of the UQB. Specifically, we hypothesized that (1) between 1992 and 1996, the social selectivity of the UQB remained stable or even increased and (2) the social selectivity of the plain bagrut declined. The second of these two hypotheses contradicts MMI, which predicts that inequalities in the odds of obtaining the bagrut should increase or remain stable.
DATA
We analyzed data on a 20-percent sample of all Israeli native adolescents who were born between 1974 and 1978 and who were given the detailed form of the 1995 Israeli Population and Housing Census. We merged these adolescents' census records with records obtained from the Ministry of Education. These records included information on all matriculation examinations taken; grades obtained; and a variety of additional variables on students, their tracks, and their schools.2 At the time of the census, the subjects were 16-21 years old, and the vast majority of them (91 percent) were polled in their parental households. Thus, we were able to merge the subjects' records with those of their parents and hence to obtain a wealth of information on the subjects' social origins, including ethnicity, religion, parental education and occupation, the economic circumstances in the parental household, and more. We excluded immigrants from the data set because we did not want to confuse educational processes that were occurring in Israel with those that the subjects may have experienced abroad prior to immigration. Finally, we excluded the graduation cohort of 1994 because the proportion of this cohort for whom we could merge the census and ministry files was suspiciously low.3 Our initial sample size for native Israelis was 88,063, but after we deleted cases, we were left with 69,817.
VARIABLES
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our study was the type of bagrut obtained. Its categories were not eligible, eligible for a plain bagrut, and eli- Parental Education Parental education was measured in two ways. In the descriptive analysis, it was measured as a categorical variable representing the highest certificate attained by either parent. In the multivariate analysis, it was measured more parsimoniously as the average number of school years completed by the parents. When information was missing on either parent, we assigned the value of the parent for whom data were available.4 When information was missing on both parents' education, the missing values were replaced by the mean of the respondent's ethnic group. In addition, a dummy indicator for missing value was included in the equation. We continued the descriptive analysis by studying changes in the rates of obtaining a UQB. When one compares Figure 2a with Figure 1a , one can see that the female advantage with regard to the bagrut carries over to the UQB, although the rate of increase of the two groups, with regard to the UQB, is about equal. In other words, the female advantage in obtaining the UQB did not increase over time as it had increased for the plain bagrut.
Economic Circumstances This variable mea-
We hypothesized that as rates of eligibility for the bagrut increased, the social selectivity of the UQB would increase. Figures 2b and 2c provide partial support for the hypothesis: Figure 2b shows that the gaps among the Jewish ethnic groups were stable, but the rates for Christian Arabs and particularly for Muslims and Druse rose more slowly. In other words, Muslims and Druse appear to have benefited the least from the reforms with regard to the UQB. Figure 2c repeats the analysis for categories of parents' diploma and reveals a clear pattern: The increase in the eligibility rate for the UQB is related to parental education, and the gap between the categories widened.
In sum, the descriptive analysis shows that the reforms raised the eligibility for the bagrut and that the rate rose more sharply for women than for men. All ethnic groups and parental-education strata benefited from the reforms, and their rates increased at a similar pace. The reforms also increased the proportion of students who were eligible for a UQB. The increase was similar for men and women, slower for Arabs than for Jews, and faster for those whose parents were more educated.
Multivariate Analysis
We now evaluate the consequences of the reforms for inequalities in the odds of matriculation in a multivariate framework. We studied change, before and after the reforms, in the effects of sex, ethnicity, parental education, and economic condition on the odds of obtaining a plain bagrut and a UQB. Toward this end, we estimated a multinomial logit model contrasting the plain bagrut and the UQB against not eligible.5 The model includes the main effects of the explanatory variables, as well as the interactions of sex, ethnicity, parental education, and economic condition with cohort. In the presence of interactions of cohort and all the remaining explanatory variables, the main effects represent the prereform period. The interactions with cohort represent the change in the effects of the various variables before and after the reforms. Table 2 , one sees that in the prereform period, women were more likely to obtain the plain bagrut than were men and that the effect of parental education and the economic circumstances of the family of origin were positive and significant. Ceteris paribus, Christian Arabs, were significantly more likely, and North African and second-generation Jews were less likely, than were other ethnic groups to obtain the plain bagrut. In the prereform period, students in the academic track were 50 percent as likely as were students in the vocational track to obtain the plain bagrut, and those who did not attend secondary school were far less likely to do so.6
Plain Bagrut In the first column of
The reforms increased the overall odds of matriculation by about 40 percent. They also produced changes in sex, socioeconomic, and ethnic inequalities in the likelihood of obtaining the bagrut. The interaction between sex and cohort shows that the reforms further increased the advantage of women over men. The interaction between parental education and cohort shows that in the postreform period, the effect of parental education declined. This change is less consistent with MMI than it is with the alternative hypothesis, which predicts a decline in the social selectively of plain bagrut. It was surprising to find that the significant effect of the interaction between cohort and the academic track is positive. This finding indicates, contrary to expectation, that the reforms The reforms increased the odds of a UQB about fourfold (the effect of cohort is 4.31). The interactions show that the reforms did not affect inequality by sex. Nor did they change the effect of parental education. However, the benefit associated with advantageous economic circumstances increased significantly.
The most noteworthy finding in this part of the analysis is the effect of the reforms on track inequality. After the reforms, academictrack students were only 3.7 (14.78*0.25 = 3.7) times as likely as were vocational-track students to obtain a UQB, whereas their advantage before the reforms was about 15 times as great. Recall that in the first column of the table, the interaction effect between cohort and the academic track was positive and significant, indicating that, contrary to expectation, the reforms increased the difference between these tracks in the odds of obtaining a plain bagrut. Could it be that the academization of vocational education increased the odds of vocational students obtaining a UQB but reduced their odds of obtaining a plain bagrut? We returned to the raw data and computed, for the pre-and postreform cohorts, the track percentage of the students who obtained each of the two diplomas (see Figure 3) . As can be seen, in the academic track, the increase in the overall matriculation rate was due primarily to a 4-point rise in the percentage obtaining a UQB, coupled with a small decline in the percentage obtaining a plain bagrut. In the vocational track, in contrast, the reform was much more effective in enabling students to obtain a UQB than it was in raising the overall matriculation rate (the total of plain bagrut and UQB). The former rose by over 11 percent, whereas the latter rose by 5.3 percent (from 19.5 to 24.8). Recall that prior to the reforms, only students in the more elitist vocational tracks (MASMAT) could matriculate and that the vast majority of vocational students were in the nonmatriculating tracks. The data shown in Figure 3 suggest that the reforms offered former MASMAT students an "upgrade" from bagrut to UQB but did little to raise the overall matriculation rate among vocational students. The social origin of MASAMT students is superior, on average, than that of other vocational students (Yogev & Ayalon 1991) . Thus, the main beneficiaries of the reforms are more likely to be the relatively privileged vocational students.
Comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 shows that the reforms affected socioeconomic and sex stratification of the plain bagrut and of the UQB in different ways: They enhanced the advantage of women over men in obtaining a plain bagrut, but did not change it in obtaining a UQB; they reduced the effect of parental education on obtaining the bagrut, but not on obtaining the UQB; and they did not change the advantage attached to economic circumstances in the bagrut, but increased it in the UQB. Thus, the reforms decreased the socioeconomic stratification of the plain bagrut, but increased the stratification of the UQB. These results are consistent with the hypothesis derived from EMI, which predicted that as a result of the reforms, socioeconomic and ethnic differences in the odds of obtaining the bagrut would decline, whereas their effects on the UQB would not change or would even increase. The differentiation between the bagrut and the UQB was the key to the "success" of the Israeli reforms of the 1990s. Rising eligibility rates for the bagrut and the UQB, as well as the relative equalization of bagrut rates, enabled Rubinstein to claim success in reducing social barriers in education. At the same time, the UQB enabled the universities to maintain high selection criteria and reduced their opposition to the reform.
At about the same time, Israeli higher education was also reformed. Whereas the vast majority of students attended seven selective universities until 1994, during the second half of the 1990s, the number of degree-granting institutions increased tenfold. Most of the new colleges admit students with a plain bagrut and do not require a UQB. The expansion of less-selective higher education offers matriculates who did not meet the UQB requirements options that did not exist before the mid-1990s, thus blurring the distinction between the two forms of bagrut. This expansion made the differentiation more acceptable to the public, although university education, which is still considered better, more prestigious, and less expensive than some of the alternatives, could maintain and increase its level of selectivity.
This article has also alluded to the debate on tracking. The differentiation of the bagrut is a form of tracking in so far as the configuration of the examinations determines future opportunities. Tracking is often viewed as a mechanism of social exclusion and of the reproduction of inequality. We have shown as well that the UQB, the upper track in the case of the bagrut, is socially exclusive. However, tracking also enables the educational system as a whole to bring in students who may otherwise remain outside it. This, we believe, is the central dilemma in the field of educational stratification: As a mechanism of both inclusion and exclusion, is tracking reducing inequality or enhancing it? Our results support the view that the two functions of tracking are indivisible. As tracking differentiates opportunities within, the educational system as a whole can reduce barriers that are outside it. 3. As we noted in note 2, the overall proportion of census cases for which we merged Ministry of Education records was 72 percent: 70 percent for the 1992 cohort, 73 percent for the 1993 cohort, 74 percent for the 1995 cohort, and 75 percent for the 1996 cohort. For the 1994 cohort, only 64 percent of the cases were merged. It should be noted that for each of the cohorts, data were provided in a different file. We suspect that the low merge rate for the 1994 cohort was due to the loss of cases in the processing of the files at either the Ministry of Education or the Central Bureau of Statistics.
4. Even so, we were left with 21.8 percent of cases for which data on parental educational were missing. Of these cases, 9 percent were cases for which the respondents' parental records were not found (most likely because the respondents no longer lived in the parental households), and for 12.8 percent, no information was provided.
5. We considered using ordered logit but decided against it because our hypothesis is that the effects of social origins on the plain bagrut and on the UQB changed in opposite directions following the reforms. This change would not have been picked up by ordered logit analysis.
6. The significant and positive effect of the Track Missing category suggests that it includes a disproportionate number of academic-track students. This hypothesis is substantiated by the large effect of the category on the odds of obtaining a UQB discussed later.
7. For most Jews, English is a second language, whereas for Arabs, it is a third language after Arabic and Hebrew. In unreported analyses, we found that of the three UQB requirements (passing advanced English, mathematics, and an additional advanced subject), advanced English is the most difficult hurdle for Muslims. Christian Arabs are more successful in English because most of them attend church schools, where European languages are taught intensively.
